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Motivation 
My initial motivation for writing this project concerned trafficking in women which constitutes a 
billion-dollar industry of about 2 million people being trafficked cross-border a year (Naím 
2005:88) with 59% of them being women and 17% girls (UNODC 2012:10). However, I came to 
realise that the term "trafficking" is more applicable in political context and mostly when looking at 
migrants in illegal jobs, while the term in economical context was more or less useless because the 
distinctions of when something constitutes "trafficking", "smuggling" or "economical migration" 
are in fact rather blurry and relies heavily on political perceptions rather than economical realities. 
Instead of looking at trafficking I chose to look at "unregulated migrants" since my sector of interest 
was domestic work - work within the family household as e.g. nannies and maids. My usage of the 
term "unregulated" is not without controversy, yet I find it suitable to describe the domestic sector 
which constitutes a regulatory grey-zone since the employer is the individual household and the 
unionisation of migrant women is close to non-existing. This sector is my area of interest for this 
project. 
Introduction 
Global migration has increased steady over the past 50 years. From estimated 75 million migrants in 
1960 to 214 million migrants globally today. In other words about 3 % of the world's population 
now constitutes migrants. By 2050 the global stock of migrants will be somewhere between 235 
and 415 million people, therefore it is increasingly important to consider migrants as a part of our 
contemporary and future history and social, political and economical concerns (IOM 2010:7). Other 
estimates put the number of just migrant workers as high as 232 million people today (ILO.org 
2014). In other words the exact number of migrants is impossible to know, but what we do know is 
that it is substantial. 
There are several reasons why people migrate: climate changes, political oppression, war, hunger, 
poverty. A great group are migrating for the promise of gaining jobs abroad, these are so-called 
labour migrants. In Europe there is a lot of debate about attracting highly skilled labour to increase 
growth in the individual state, however, the tradition of employing low-skilled migrant labour is far 
greater. Especially in the developed countries the option of using low-wage labour in low-skilled 
jobs has been utilised in such diverse sectors as agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transport, 
customer service, sales and, as this project concerns, domestic work (Dumbrava 2008 & OECD 
2006:57). 
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The tradition of using migrants in domestic work goes longer back than the modern type of labour 
market. Domestic workers is one of the oldest and most important occupations for women globally 
and the history of domestic workers is closely related to the history of servitude such as butlers, 
nannies and maids as well as that of colonialism and slavery - both linked with using migrant 
workers willingly or unwillingly. Generally, the domestic work-sector has always been highly 
dominated by migrants and low-wage labour in general (ILO 2010a:5). However, with modern 
labour regulations the problems inherent in the domestic work-sector becomes more evident. 
International Labour Organization (ILO)'s domestic workers convention highlights many of the in-
built problems of domestic work: 
"Recognizing the significant contribution of domestic workers to the global economy, which 
includes increasing paid job opportunities for women and men workers with family responsibilities, 
greater scope for caring for ageing populations, children and persons with a disability, and 
substantial income transfers within and between countries, and 
Considering that domestic work continues to be undervalued and invisible and is mainly carried out 
by women and girls, many of whom are migrants or members of disadvantaged communities and 
who are particularly vulnerable to discrimination in respect of conditions of employment and of 
work, and to other abuses of human rights, and 
Considering also that in developing countries with historically scarce opportunities for formal 
employment, domestic workers constitute a significant proportion of the national workforce and 
remain among the most marginalized, and 
Recalling that international labour Conventions and Recommendations apply to all workers, 
including domestic workers, unless otherwise provided, (...)" (ILO 2011, C189) 
Domestic work as a sector is highly feminised with about 83% constituting women on a global 
scale (ILO 2013:21). Domestic work is often considered "women's job" and the work is in most 
households done by the women of the household without wage and without being considered 
"actual work"; this leaves increasing pressure on working women in the developed world, who are 
expected to maintain the household as well as earn wage on the labour market. Moreover, domestic 
work is usually highly undervalued - there is no prominence from society in being a domestic 
worker. This results in a sector which is underpaid and with jobs which often offers poor working 
conditions (ILO 2013 & Peterson 2005). 
The sector is dominated by an overwhelming majority of migrants - both legal and illegal and 
anywhere in between. Therefore the sector is also a part of the so-called informal sector or shadow 
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economy, because many domestic workers work illegally and outside formal labour market 
regulations (ILO 2010a:1,6,14). This is problematic both for the state which lacks control and taxes, 
but also for the workers who lack basic labour regulations and are put outside labour legislations 
(ILO 2013). 
 
Even though domestic workers are considered low-skilled workers they play a crucial role in the 
family. They take care of the household and its members in situations where the family either need 
or want help to cook, clean or participate in the care work for the family members. In some 
countries the state offers public provisions to help with, most often, caring for younger and elder, 
but this is not the case globally - not even in all developed countries (OECD 2013; Williams & 
Gavanas 2008). Thus some households become dependent on domestic workers to make ends meet. 
 
My project concerns this widespread use of migrant domestic workers in developed countries - 
particularly Europe, and why we keep on using them. What makes migrant domestic workers 
needed in developed economies? What role do they perform in our economy? And why do we need 
more now than we did decades ago? 
Problem statement 
Which economical pull-factors can explain the widespread demand for unregulated female 
migrants in domestic work in developed countries? 
Working questions: 
• What characterises domestic work? 
• Why are we using migrants to do "our" work? 
• What are the structural socio-economic dimensions of the employment of domestic 
workers? 
Elaboration: What are "pull-factors"? 
Pull-factors are the economies of demand. In the logic of the term demand "pulls" supply of 
employment, capital, commodities etc. (True 2012:64). However, creating demand is associated 
with a very Keynesian sort of economy where the state controls demand to increase production and 
I therefore reside from using this term (Schwartz 2010:145 & 178ff). Instead the term "pull-factors" 
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is linked to a push/pull-dialectic where some factors pull both labour and capital while other factors 
push labour and capital - thus creating the supply to accede the demand. 
Migration studies often use the framework of "push and pull" which includes both economical, 
environmental, cultural and political factors. Push within this framework means what drives or 
forces the individual or group of migrants to leave their home, these factors are forceful and can 
include e.g. political prosecution, environmental disaster and lack of job. Pull-factors, on the other 
hand, are the factors which attract migrants to a specific location. These can include jobs, the hope 
of bettering ones life circumstances and security (Lane Tech Wiki 2013 & Levin Institute 2014). 
Migration studies' view on push-pull-factors is much related to the agency of the migrants - why 
they are migrating. The economical view, however, is more related to the demands of capital which 
structurally causes labour to act a certain way. My operationalisation of the term resides in a Global 
Political Economy-view somewhere in the middle, where push and pull is considered dialectic in 
nature. My focus will be on the material circumstances which pulls migration towards the 
industrialised countries. This view leaves little room for the agency of the individual migrant, but I 
find it important to emphasize that my view is not that migrants have no agency, instead I see their 
agency as relating to the structural pull-effects of materialism; they migrate to better their lives. 
This employment of pull-factors is inspired by Jacqui True's feminist political economy which 
highlights that the strong pull-factor for (female) migrants arises from the way women are 
positioned in family constitutions in the global north as well as aging populations and declining 
birth rates which results in that "(...) the certainty of supply perpetuates substandard labor 
conditions" (True 2012:64). 
What is "domestic work"? 
In the literature of female migrant workers several different categories of work exist: care-work, 
domestic work, reproductive work, au pair, nannies, maids etc.. What unifies these types of work is 
that they all constitute feminised and underprivileged jobs, often, but not necessarily, taking place 
in the home of the receivers. Some of them are formalised in different economies with different 
levels of social security. However, I will argue that the problems with these categories is that what 
separates them is rather blurry. All of these definitions involve a large part of unregulated labour. 
Because of this unregulated nature the amount of data on the types of work is scarce and 
overlapping in categories, making it hard to distinguish the work-types because those migrant 
women who are working to take care of the kids of a family (as a nanny) are often expected or at 
least encouraged to also clean the house (as a maid) as well as cook dinner, walk the dog and take 
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care of the families' elders (Williams & Gavanas 2008:19ff). The combination of these types of jobs 
are often known as au pairs, however, since au pair is a specific organisational programme of 
cultural exchange (Zarembka 2003:148-149) I believe the category to be insufficient. I have instead 
chosen to use the category "domestic work" because this category is focused on work done within 
the private household, most often work which is traditionally expected of housewives to fulfil; This 
definition excludes any work done within institutions such as orphanages and retirement homes. 
The phenomena of hiring migrant women to do domestic job thus gathers many of the 
abovementioned jobs around the family as a work-environment and the trend of substituting the 
domestic work done by the family itself with outside help. This use of the term aligns with ILO-
conventions which classify that "(b) the term domestic worker means any person engaged in 
domestic work within an employment relationship;" (ILO 2011, C189). This definition relies on the 
economical relations of employer and worker for definition - that the worker is employed by a 
private domestic household, rather than a e.g. task-specific definition, which rests on the tasks done 
by the workers for definition; my usage is what the International Labour Office calls the "industry-
based approach" (ILO 2013:8-10). 
Methodological grounding 
I employ a two-legged critical approach, one inspired by feminism and another inspired by 
materialism. Both are grounded in the broader tradition of critical IPE 
The broader tradition stresses that economy is not just disembodied markets and states, but 
constitutes a social and historical context. Economy is social and the social context and relations 
within economy matters, as both institutions and actors are inherently part of a social context. In 
this line of thinking the bodies of the people in the economy matters, and the structures of the 
economy is constituted by human bodies of class and gender. The notion of apolitical structures is 
thus considered a cloak for the hierarchical relations of work and structural relations of power in 
society; some benefits while others do not in the economy. Gendered IPE though has taken a 
position in the periphery of critical IPE and is not truly used nor taken seriously by the broader 
school of critical IPE, especially by those closely related to or recognized by the more mainstream 
IPE who do not see gender as a relevant body of analysis, but as a category to be added to already 
existing theories and analysis (Griffin 2007:721-728). However, I see the discussions of the 
differences in schools and traditions of critical IPE as irrelevant in the context of my project, and I 
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have above instead highlighted the fundamental ontological similarities of critical IPE to show the 
base of my scientific understandings. 
 
My view of how gender is applicable in global political economy can be summed up as: 
"(...) gender is seen, not just as a category of analysis among others, but as a core concern, 
implicated in the fundamental assumptions out of which economic processes are fashioned and on 
which they revolve. It makes little sense for engaged, and engaging, IPE to separate the processes 
of the global political economy from their causes and effects. Once read as socially constituted, 
such causes and effects cannot conceptually and practically be disentangled from the social 
processes and relationships on which they rest." (Griffin 2007:732). 
 
My employment of materialism is inspired by Marxist insights that what truly matters in the 
economical system is commodities as commodity relations and the commodification of labour 
(Palan 2012:8); Life begins with material life - what we eat, drink, wear and how we organise. This 
means that my focus is on the production of capital and labour and my analysis will be of 
materialistic values instead of e.g. ideas and culture. However, I am also aware that "(...) culture 
and materiality [are] mutually produced (co-constituted)." (Peterson 2005:505) and as such, 
materialism cannot separate itself completely from culture. Culture is inherent, and history and 
cultural traditions truly matters (Peterson 2005:505-507). However, in terms of limiting my 
methodological scope my project will mainly concern itself with the materialism that pulls migrant 
domestic workers, not the culture - although I recognise that culture plays a vital role through e.g. 
migrant networks which pull migrant labour. The acknowledgment that history matters can be 
employed through the framework of historical materialism, another methodological approach 
which I am inspired by. Historical materialism contributes with "(...) the analysis of the 
organization of the social relations of production [which] provides the basis for an understanding 
of transnational class and state formation." (Overbeek 2012:173). My material analysis of the pull-
factors of migrant domestic workers brings with it insights of class formations, because class 
formations are inherent in production and social relations; one decides over another and 
commodities are unequally distributed, creating such classes. 
 
In terms of whether it is structure or agency which shapes human behaviour and thus shapes the 
global political economy, I do in my project lean towards structural explanations. The pull-term 
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which I employ look at structural trends such as the labour market, supply-demand and migrant 
class formations. I do however wish to emphasise that I am not seeking to disempower migrant 
workers of their agency. Every migrant who is not forced chooses to migrate, many because of the 
promises of jobs, money or to better their own and their relatives life-circumstances. My protect is 
not to demean this agency. Instead my project seeks to find the structural explanatory factors which 
makes it attractive for women to work as migrant domestic workers. Yet this is only explaining one 
side of the mutually constitutive dialectic between agency and structure. 
Selection of theory 
My theoretical framework is constituted by economical feminism - the assumption that 
globalisation is affecting women and men differently and that some types of labour are inherently 
gendered. I am supplementing this approach with the concept of pull-factors as determent for 
capital and labour, for this I use Jacqui True's work "The Political Economy of Violence Against 
Women". Moreover, I use the work of Jane Wills et.al. on migrant labour in the service industry in 
current England as a theoretical notion complementing the economical feminism as well as the 
more traditional economical notions of pull-factors, supply-chains, labour-formation and 
economical demand, which I also employ. Lastly I use Beverly Silver's work on labour organisation 
and labour power as another theoretical cornerstone in describing domestic workers as a group of 
labour. 
I have deemed it beneficial to use this palette of theories as I believe they can attribute migrant 
domestic workers with a more nuanced and multifaceted analysis. Migrant domestic workers are 
both an example of economical feminism in practice because it is a type of labour extremely 
dominated by females. Moreover, they are an example of migrant labour in the service industries as 
well as a group of labour with the potential of organising around a specific type of work. I see that 
the theories can complement each other since they are all fundamentally founded in critical IPE, but 
with their individual take on what consequences the economical system has on the individual or 
group. Had I only relied on one or two theories, I would risk seeing the field much less nuanced. 
Selection of empirical data 
One of many issues with data on migrant domestic workers is that the level of regulation of the 
sector differs greatly and is registered differently across states. Moreover, many migrant domestic 
workers are undocumented or illegal and might not be captured by statistics. That said even if they 
are managed to be included, their reluctance to answer in-detail about their jobs and places of origin 
will hinder correct hard data (ILO 2013:11-16). The project's data relies on statistics by the 
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International Labour Organization (ILO) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), both highly valid sources widely used in the field. 
ILO's data is a conservative estimate, because, while they have tried making room for 
undocumented labour in their estimates, they still recognise that their numbers constitute the 
minimum number of migrant domestic workers, not the total. I therefore use the numbers as 
estimates to identify trends within the economy and the penetration of domestic workers, not as 
reflecting the de facto situation. 
ILO's data is gathered by using national data resources both from labour offices and migrant 
organisations. In the case where national data has not been available - especially in developing 
countries, samples have been used as representative for the entire population. Furthermore, in the 
situation where data have been from different years, the number of domestic workers for the given 
year has been calculated with reference to general trends in population growth. This leaves us with 
fairly valid estimates of domestic workers. However, these estimates suffer from national 
differences in data collection and data resources as well as lack of data for given countries (ILO 
2013: 7-17). However, ILO's data still remains the most valid data and widely reflects the amount 
of (migrant) domestic workers. The biggest problem with my use of the data is that they are not 
specifying the number of migrants within the domestic work sector, and thus I can only rely on their 
estimates that it is the far majority of the sector which constituted by migrants (ILO 2013: 31ff, 39). 
I use OECD's annual reports to highlight the penetration of migrant workers in Europe and North 
America more generally, including which sectors that hire most migrant workers. OECD's data is 
based on the member states individually data collections. 
Any data on migrant domestic workers should be considered critically. This is also why the notion 
"unregulated" is seen more as a descriptive feature of domestic workers as labour because empirical 
data can only be constituted by estimates. 
 
Lastly, I use different qualitative empirical data gathered from the academia literature mostly from 
the books Migration and Domestic Work edited by Lutz on migrant domestic workers in Europe. 
Moreover I use some of Global Woman edited by Ehrenreich and Hochschild on migrant domestic 
workers in US. It is in this qualitative material I see that I can vindicate my usage of ILO's numbers 
of domestic workers to say something about migrant domestic workers specifically. 
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Walk-through of project 
After this section I will describe my theoretical framework for the project, before arriving at the 
analysis. My analysis is structured in three parts - analysis part 1, part 2 and part 3. These three 
parts are structured according to my three working questions. First analytical chapter answers the 
question of what characterises domestic work. Second chapter addresses the question of why we are 
using migrants as labour. Third chapter looks at the structural socio-economic dimension of the 
employment of domestic workers. I have chosen to intermingle both descriptive parts of the analysis 
as well as aspects of discussion, empirical data and theory into one collected analysis of three parts. 
The analysis is concluded with the Conclusion on page 35, followed by my further perspectives-
section which points at other empirical and theoretical notions which would be relevant to follow 
given the project's conclusion. 
Theoretical framework 
My theoretical framework is founded in economical feminism because my project examines female 
migrants and thus is inherently focused on gender. Economical feminism involves an 
acknowledgement that globalisation is affecting males and females differently and unevenly, that 
the "benefits and cost of globalisation [are] unevenly distributed between men and women, [and] 
that masculinist bias in theory/practice exacerbates structural hierarchies of race/ethnicity, class 
and nation." (Peterson 2005:507). That the global dominance of (white) men in power positions 
creates unequal development, often suppressing women, working class and non-whites. This 
complies with a more general notion among critical IPE that economical processes are "(...) 
intrinsically social processes." (Griffin 2007:723). And thus markets are always entrenched within, 
not independent from, a social context (Griffin 2007:724). 
 
Moreover, it is the acknowledgement that different types of labour is inherently "gendered", that 
some jobs hold assumptions of a specific gender which is considered better able to do the job. This 
is not to say that the world constitutes of two dialectic genders which are in nature different, or to 
argue the non-existence of other categories of gender than the classical dichotomy of male and 
female - this I will leave to the LGBT-community which employs a more critical approach on the 
idea that society has a dichotomy of only two genders. It is instead to acknowledge that there are 
historical and cultural traditions which have constructed gender-codes in specific types of work, 
specifically hard physical work as stereotypical "male" and soft care-work and domestic work as 
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specifically "female" and that these gender-codes are produced and reproduced through our society 
and the global political economy (Peterson 2005). In the sitcom "friends" there is an excellent 
example where the couple Ross and Rachel hires a male nanny, "Sandy", to take care of their baby. 
This controversial hiring of a male nanny consequently leaves all the male main-characters 
uncomfortable and questioning the masculinity of the nanny because of his profession (Friends 
2002). This example shows that some jobs are inherently gendered and are seen as more suitable for 
a specific gender. 
The gender-coding of different types of work have hierarchal implications. The inherent masculine, 
types of work are privileged above the feminised, creating a hierarchy in the economic system of 
what constitutes "most important" work and "less important" work, reflecting in political 
prioritisation and wage. The result is that the definitions of what constitutes "value" in our economy 
are inherently masculinised, emphasizing paid work in the formal economy. This means that the 
domestic, reproductive and caring labour, mostly dominated by females and inherently feminised, is 
deemed inferior and marginalised in our assumptions of what is important work in our economy. 
Thus this work is typically unpaid and taken for granted because its assumed economical value is 
deemed unimportant, or at least not as important as the inherent masculinised jobs (Peterson 
2005:500ff). Moreover, some theoreticians claim that in waged labour a female workforce is 
sometimes preferred over a male because the females are "(...) imagined relative to males to be 
easier to regulate and control." (Griffin 2007:726). This is particularly applicable to the production 
and manufacturing industry which increasingly prefers female labour. Yet I see the insight that the 
devaluing of female labour is not just about the nature of the labour, but also about assumptions of 
the female gender itself as being more obedient, tolerant and conforming than male labour is 
relevant (Griffin 2007:726ff). The differences between the genders position in the economy is not 
given, it is perceived (Griffin 2007:732). 
 
This is problematic because: 
"[T]he reproduction of capitalism depends on more than the activities associated with the 
production and exchange of commodities. [...] the reproduction of capitalism is fundamentally 
underpinned by the historically, culturally and geographically specific relations of social 
reproduction that reproduce communities, including the labour force, often without being formally 
recognised or compensated" (Roberts 2012:24). 
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In other words: the feminised workload actually is important because reproductive work is essential 
in creating a future workforce to maintain a prosperous society, thus the negligence is essentially 
problematic. 
 
This view reveals a whole sub-economy which has been deemed irrelevant as factors in economy. 
The amount of domestic, reproductive and care-work cannot be read in economic calculations, 
unless the individual country has chosen to formalise parts of the care-work through e.g. welfare-
societal elder- or children-care as regulated jobs with wage. However, many of the domestic core-
tasks are still not applied in the national economy, though the work done is deemed essential for 
development and the long-term production of social capital (Peterson 2005:501 & Roberts 
2012:24). This taken-for-granted devaluation of traditional "female work" is expanded to include 
so-called "feminised others" such as migrants, marginalised populations, unskilled workers, the 
urban underclass and developing countries, expanding the pool of devaluated work to include the 
far majority of the populations' work. This devaluing is either overlooked on a policy-level or 
vindicated through cultural traditions and expectations (Peterson 2005:508). 
 
However, it is important to notice that the economical feminism approach does not mean that all 
women share the same experiences and are equally oppressed, if oppressed at all, by the economical 
system. Women's issues are still immersed in their socio-economic context and cannot be separated 
from same, and the socio-economic situation of women across the globe differs (Griffin 2007:729). 
This is also why I see a categorical difference between the women who live in households that 
employ female domestic workers and the female domestic workers themselves whose socio-
economic situation is rather different; without such categorical difference we might risk seeing the 
two of them as sisters in global solidarity. 
 
What is essential in the feminised critique of the economical system is that women and men are 
"[...]differently engaged with and affected by political economy [...]" (Peterson 2005:502). This 
means that we cannot just add women to immanent masculine analysis's, we have to tweak theory 
and transform the constructions, altering the masculine premise. We have to deconstruct the 
privileging of a masculine understanding of economy and apply an understanding of economy as 
something which needs to reproduce itself not just in commodity, but in humans as resource 
(Peterson 2005:502).
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ANALYSIS PART 1 
How widespread is domestic work? 
Domestic work constitutes one of the biggest employments worldwide. In ILO's new fairly 
conservative study in 2010 an estimated 52,6 million men and female were employed as domestic 
workers worldwide, a number which has risen with about 20 million from 1995 to 2010 (ILO 
2013:19, 39). In other words: "If all domestic workers worked in one country, this 
country would be the tenth largest employer worldwide." (ILO 2013:19). Domestic work accounts 
for at least 1,7 % of total employment worldwide and 3,6 % of all waged employment, making 
domestic work an extremely important source of employment. However, there is reason to believe 
that the actual number is closer to 100 million (ILO 2013:19ff). These estimates does not include 
children below the working age (often age 15 or 16) as domestic workers since they are seen as 
minors and thus excluded. Yet if we were to include children the figures would probably be even 
higher as there are at least 7,4 million children below age 15 in the domestic sector (ILO 
2013:22ff). 
In the cross field of the tertiary sector & the reproductive sector 
In classic economical theory domestic work is part of the tertiary sector or the service sector 
(OECD 2006:55-56). The service sector now constitutes more than 70% of most developed 
economies and thus becomes one of the most important and critical sectors of modern economies 
(Schwartz 2010:298). The tertiary sector is defined in relation to the primary sector which concerns 
raw-materials and extraction such as agriculture, fishing and mining and the secondary sector 
concerning manufacturing of finished goods. Unlike these sectors the service sector does not 
produce any goods but "intangible goods" such as knowledge, sales, banking, transport, advice, 
entertainment, media or, as this project concerns, domestic work (Rosenberg 2014). Though 
domestic work might include some sort of goods such as food it is not considered a goods-trading 
relation, but a service relation. 
However, what remains interesting looking at domestic work in the service sector is that while most 
service jobs are regulated in the developed countries in terms of wages, work-hours and job-
conditions in general, domestic workers remain fairly unregulated. This is evident in ILO statistics 
which concludes that the amount of domestic workers far exceeds the official statistics (ILO 2013), 
but moreover that only 10% of domestic workers are covered by the general labour legislation and 
are often excluded from standard labour regulations such as minimum wage and work-hours, and 
  16 
labour legislations (ILO 2013:51,95ff). Though the number of domestic workers covered by labour 
legislation has significantly increased and covers up to 50% of domestic workers in some developed 
economies (ILO 2013:51), there still remains a rather large group which is unregulated. 
Furthermore, I would argue that since the domestic work sector is widely dominated by migrant 
workers and the shadow economy, the real numbers are even higher. This is distinctive in the 
economies of the developed countries which are very regulated and where the domestic work stands 
out as a notably unregulated sector as a whole. 
Moreover, what really becomes an issue with domestic work is that it traditionally constitutes a part 
of the reproductive economy which is widely performed outside the sphere and logic of markets and 
employment, as seen in the theoretical framework-section (Roberts 2012:24 & Peterson 2005:501). 
Being part of the reproductive sector results in that the job has historically not been accredited 
wage, but has been done by e.g. housewives without wage and often without expectation of same. 
However, the job still contains a workload which, because of the nature of the job, has never been 
formalised into the economy. This makes the domestic work sector even more obscure, because in 
addition to being included in the reproductive sector it is divided between informal (i.e. unpaid) 
domestic work and formal domestic work, while data on both types of domestic work are abstruse. 
The result of this is that domestic works manages to place itself both as part of the tertiary sector, 
but also relating to the reproductive sector - and fairly invisible in both sectors.  
The feminisation of domestic work (& men in domestic work) 
Of the minimum 52,6 million domestic workers worldwide 83 % constitutes women, making 
domestic work an outright female dominated sector (ILO 2013:21). The reasons for this massive 
female overrepresentation in the domestic work are historical. As stated in the theoretical 
framework-section some jobs are specifically gender-coded and domestic work is perceived as a 
soft feminised job. It is simply seen as female to perform cleaning, caring and cooking and the 
assumption is that females are better capable of this type of job (Peterson 2005:508ff). Traditionally 
it is expected that the housewife is performing these tasks, but it seems that the expectation of 
female labour is transferred into a preference for hiring female domestic workers.  
There are approximately 17% men in the sector on a global scale, however, data shows that the men 
who are employed in domestic work often perform different jobs such as gardeners, chauffeurs and 
security guards (ILO 2013:19), leaving the more traditional feminised jobs such as caring, cooking 
and cleaning to the women. Domestic work is a feminised type of job, performed more or less 
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exclusively by women. In the cases where men are hired in the domestic sector, they are hired in 
jobs that have never been gender-coded as female.  
How does domestic work differ from other types of labour? 
I hope that this chapter have revealed what distinguishes the domestic work sector. There are a 
number of ways in which domestic work differs from other types of labour. As abovementioned the 
sector is more or less completely feminised and most jobs are done by women. The sector employs 
an overwhelming share of migrant workers. There is little data on what the actual amount is, but it 
is estimated as substantial; For instance a 2001 census in Buenos Aires counted more than 50% of 
domestic workers as being migrant and in Spain 78,4% of all registered domestic workers were 
foreign-born in 2008 (ILO 2013:23-24, 27, 36, 39). Moreover, domestic work has the feature that it 
cannot be outsourced. It also needs flexible and experienced workers, because the job includes 
being able to integrate into the employers household, making the job itself very intimate. Lastly, 
being a domestic worker is not just a question of simple replacement or substitution of the mother-
in-house, instead it is to supplement the households own (unpaid) "domestic work"; this involves 
that the domestic worker must place herself in a personal relationship with the household and thus 
her employer(s) (Lutz 2008:1-3).  
Why have the domestic workers never been able to gain standard labour 
conditions? 
As I have already highlighted, domestic workers are rarely covered by the same labour legislations 
and regulations as other types of workers. When ILO first adopted standards of Holiday with Pay 
for all workers in 1936, it from the very beginning excluded domestic workers. Though ILO 
emphasised the importance of establishing international regulation for domestic workers as wage-
earners just after, it still remains the case today that domestic workers are excluded from ordinary 
and often taken-for-granted provisions such as maternity leave, work hours, minimum wage etc.. It 
was expected that the workers themselves would eventually demand these standard labour 
conditions, aligning the sector with the rest of the labour market, however, this has seized to be the 
case (ILO 2013:1). If we see the domestic work sector through the lenses of Beverly Silver's theory 
on workers' bargaining power, we might understand why. 
 
Beverly Silver differs between associational and structural power. Associational power is related to 
the formation of collective organisations of workers i.e. unions. Structural power, on the other hand, 
is related to the position the worker(s) comprise in the economic system. Structural power can be 
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divided into two subtypes, marketplace bargaining power and workplace bargaining power. The 
marketplace-subtype is a result from "tight labour markets", and can e.g. be related to the workers' 
possession of scarce skills which are in demand by employers or low levels of general 
unemployment, both generally decreasing job-competition; moreover, it can stem from the ability of 
workers to survive on non-wage sources of income as e.g. welfare. Workplace bargaining power 
instead relies on the workplace having a vital structural position which can cause disruptions in e.g. 
supply-chains - this would be the instance with monopoly (Silver 2003:13). Using this lenses we 
can start by pointing at what the domestic workers do not have. Firstly, they have not historically 
unionised on any larger scale but through some national unions and a few international initiatives. 
Examples of these include the international research policy network "International Domestic 
Workers' Network", the New York organisation "Domestic Workers United" for Caribbean, Latin 
American and African workers, the South African union "South African Domestic Service and 
Allied Workers Union"  and the US union "United Domestic Workers of America". Moreover, the 
"International Domestic Workers' Network" has in late 2013 created an international union called 
"The International Domestic Workers' Federation" which might have potential for the future of 
domestic workers' bargaining power (DWU 2014; IDWF 2014; SADSAWU 2014; WIEGO 2014 & 
UDW 2014). ILO is continuously trying to form collective demands but are struggling, this might 
be due to the mere nature of domestic work which is characterised by the workplace being the 
individual household and thus the domestic workers are scattered across different households - there 
is no collective place for the workers to naturally meet and organise. Furthermore, workers are often 
restricted from leaving their employer's household due to long working-hours or sometimes even 
prohibited by their employer (Zarembka 2003:142). All in all this leaves the domestic workers with 
low levels of associational power. Also, since their workplaces are scattered across households and 
distances, while the reserve army of domestic workers is so vast that any worker can be substituted, 
I would argue that their ability to wield workplace bargaining power is fairly slim. However, 
looking at the micro level of the individual household the complete opposite might be the case since 
some families become dependent on the specific domestic worker who is integrated into the 
household and with it integrated into the secrets and the everyday of the family. This could create a 
high level of dependence as there becomes no substitution of the specific domestic worker in the 
individual household, creating a high level of workplace power. Yet on the macro-level I would 
argue that this does not seem to be the case, because of the low wages, bad working conditions and 
the many working-hours which seem to be the norm within the sector. 
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In terms of marketplace bargaining power what really becomes a hindrance to the wielding of 
labour power by domestic workers is the vast pool of labour which can perform domestic work. The 
ability to perform domestic work is not considered a "scarce skill" despite the difficulties, as 
highlighted above, to integrate into the family's household; On a global scale, it seems that the most 
"scarce" of the skills required are that of being a women. Moreover, the low-skilled nature of the 
job combined with the massive pool of labour which can and are willing to perform the job results 
in a high level of job-competition undermining the ability of the workers in the sector to wield 
bargaining power. This is, however, an issue not unique for the domestic workers, but an issue 
highlighted by some as globalisation's undermining of all forms of worker's bargaining power 
(Silver 2003:13ff). The undermining is mainly happening through "(...) the mobilization of a world-
scale reserve army of labor, creating a global glut on labor markets." (Silver 2003:14). This 
massive reserve army of labour is what really hinders the wielding of bargaining power for 
domestic workers, since there will always be another worker willing to take the job. Moreover, 
many domestic workers have few alternative options of employment and their ability to survive on 
non-wage income must be recognised as fairly low.
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ANALYSIS PART 2 
Why are we using migrants to do domestic work? 
There is historical continuity in the demand for migrant domestic workers in developed economies. 
In the late 19th century most of the domestic workers in the US came from Ireland, later Germany 
and Sweden (ILO 2013:23). It was at the time observed that migrant workers were preferred 
because they would accept “longer hours, perhaps lower wages, more work, and, in general, 
conditions of employment more favorable to the employer” (I. M. Rubinow 1906 as quoted in ILO 
2013:23). This remains the truth today for domestic workers, especially those undocumented and/or 
working illegally (ILO 2013:23). 
Importing migrants to do service-jobs 
Increasingly in contemporary capitalism and economic globalization work is done transnational and 
the exchange of labour in different sectors across especially the developed and developing countries 
is widespread. The driver behind this development has been firms search for cheap(er) labour in 
especially labour-intensive production. Work is outsourced if possible to destinations with lowest 
wage to increase profits (Schwartz 2010:263ff & Silver 2003:3-8). This movement has led many 
theoreticians to conclude that we are nearing a single labour-market which has unleashed "a "race-
to-the-bottom" in wages and working conditions [...] on a world scale" (Silver 2003:4). However, 
some jobs cannot just be outsourced; we cannot ship off our buildings to Bangladesh every night to 
be cleaned or ship our bus-routes to India; the work has to be situated where the receivers are. In the 
same way domestic work is remarkably geographically bounded, the spatial fix which involves 
moving out production to follow cheap labour is impossible because it would involve moving the 
households as well (Silver 2003:76,100,106ff): Domestic work is fundamentally place-bound. 
However, the place-bound nature of these service-jobs does not limit the ability of using 
transnational migrants, who are essentially demanding less wages, to fulfil the jobs.  
 
OECD numbers show that the percentage of foreign-born workers in the labour market in almost all 
of their member countries has slowly but steadily increased in the period 2000-2008 and the 
immigration has generally increased for all OECD members looking at the trends from 1959-2009 
(OECD 2011:11, 439). Generally in OECD countries, migrants are more often overqualified for 
their jobs, showing that they are employed in lower-skilled jobs than what their training or 
education might justify. Moreover, the unemployment rates, especially for young foreign-born 
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workers, is much higher than for native-born, further pressuring the migrant workers' job situation. 
OECD numbers clearly show that the majority of migrant workers in Europe and North America are 
employed within the tertiary-sector or in service sector jobs including domestic work - this number 
is over 60% for almost all OECD countries and a massive over 75% for Sweden, UK and Norway 
(OECD 2006:5456). Within the tertiary sector, there are far more migrants than native-born doing 
low-skilled jobs (OECD 2006:56-57 & ILO 2008). This shows that the increase in migrant workers 
to developed countries is first of all a general tendency over decades, and second that the migrants 
are generally hired in lower skilled jobs than the native-born workers. 
 
Despite poor data on the area due to the unregulated nature of domestic work, some trends are 
distinguished on migrant women working in the domestic sector in Europe. Firstly, female migrants 
have done domestic work in Europe since around the middle of the nineteenth century. There seems 
to be a growing demand for women, contributing to the extreme feminisation of the domestic work 
sector. Migration in the sector has followed a pattern of East to West inside Europe and South to 
North. Migrant women today are more educated than their predecessors, often with middle class 
background and are contributing to a so-called care-drain because many of them leave behind both 
husband and children in their home-country. In this also lies that they are not leaving to start over, 
but are leaving to earn money to sustain their household at their home-country and with the 
expectation of returning to their home-country (Lutz 2008:3). Therefore their migration status is 
unique since they only consider their work as temporary. 
Migrant workers in London 
Nowhere has the trend of using migrant workers been as remarkable as the case of service-labour, 
particularly in London which is the case for Jane Wills et.al's work. They argue:  
 
"(...) London now depends on an army of foreign-born workers to clean its offices, care for its sick, 
make beds, and serve at its restaurants and bars. Many have arrived outside the official channels of 
the immigration system, coming to make London their home. While migrants have long populated 
the lower echelons of the London labour market, supplying the workers who do the dirty, dangerous 
and difficult jobs, we posit that something new has been going on over the past two decades or so. 
(...) London has become almost wholly reliant on foreign-born workers to do the city's 'bottom-end' 
jobs." (Wills et.al. 2009:1). 
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The amount of foreign-born workers or migrant workers in the developed countries has been 
steadily increasing. UK is in percentage of foreign-born workers ranking about the same (12,9% in 
2009) as most of western Europe - excluding the Nordic countries which are ranking lower (OECD 
2011:443). However, UK generally employs slightly more migrants in service jobs than most 
OECD-countries, but they only differ by a few percentage points and only in some parts of the 
service-jobs, while in others they are slightly lower (OECD 2006:57). Therefore I will argue that in 
quantitative terms the London-case is applicable to other big cities in the developed world. 
However, UK have an earlier and wider tradition of privatisation stemming from Thatcher's policies 
in the 80s (Wills. et.al. 2009:2ff). Moreover, London is a bigger, more expensive and more 
multicultural city than most other capitals and has a history of colonial power. Therefore I argue 
that London represents an extreme example of these trends and Wills et.al.'s work can be 
moderately applied to other countries with similar economical development, including other 
developed economies with a history of using migrant workers. 
 
Wills et.al.'s point is that in London there has been created a new "migrant division of labour" - the 
notion that there in London now exists a specific class of migrant workers within the service sector. 
This division is visible through an immense increase in the number of foreign-born workers in 
London, especially coming from low-income countries. 
 
"In 1986, 18 per cent of Londoners (approximately 1.17 million people) were born overseas. By 
2006, just under a third (31 per cent) of the city’s population and just over a third (35 per cent) of 
its working-age population were foreign-born, putting London in a very similar position to New 
York (...). Moreover, while a significant minority (16 per cent) of London’s recent migrants 
originated in highincome countries, and many work for the city’s finance houses and legal offices, 
the vast majority have come to London from low-income countries (62 per cent) or through the 
asylum system (22 per cent). Many of these migrants are now to be found in the least desirable 
jobs" (Wills et.al. 2009:21). 
 
These strong immigration streams of workers leaves London with resulting contrasts of wealth, 
poverty and power between foreign-born and native-born. Moreover, the labour market and thus 
economy "relies on increasing numbers of foreign-born workers to do the jobs that locals cannot be 
persuaded to do." (Wills et.al. 2009:23). It seems that the service sector is employing migrants not 
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just because they demand lower wages, but because the native-born are not willing to take many of 
the jobs in the service sector, creating a pull for migrant workers. This also results in many 
industries at least in London being completely dependent on migrant labour (Wills et.al. 2009:189). 
"The migrant division of labour" 
The migrant division of labour or the class of migrant workers in service jobs has, according to 
Wills et.al., created new types of hierarchies in London. The work perceived as skilled is being 
prioritised over perceived unskilled labour, and since the unskilled jobs are mainly performed by 
migrants the result is a prioritisation of Europeans over non-Europeans. London is therefore 
characterised by having a migrant division of labour. Workers are arranged in an immigration 
regime which ranks them according skills, nationality and welfare entitlement. Immigration status  
becomes a codifier in determining status in labour market. Though immigration status intersects 
with older regimes of hierarchy such as gender and ethnicity it does, on a broader level, trumps in 
terms of determining status - this is for instance seen in that black African men are increasingly 
seen to do traditionally feminised jobs such as sewing and low-skilled manufacturing (Wills et.al. 
2009:188ff). This is interesting because it suggests that though developed economies have become 
increasingly dependent on migrant labour, it does not necessarily result in increased prioritisation of 
same. Moreover, Wills et.al. suggest that it is not the gender-coding which is the ultimate determent 
of the status of a job in developed economies, instead it is whether the job itself is dominated by 
foreign-born or native-born. It would mean that the reason why domestic workers are ultimately 
lacking status and prioritisation is not that it is a feminised job, but instead that it is a job generally 
performed by migrants. It is Wills et.al.'s point that migrant trumps feminisation, however, I see 
both as mutually creating the undervaluation of domestic work. It is beyond doubt that the sector is 
gender-coded female and the majority of workers in the sector remains female, however, the 
domination of migrants in the sector upholds the undervaluation of domestic workers, and, perhaps, 
even makes the sector less valued than sectors which are only feminised and not dominated by 
migrants. 
 
Wills et.al. ultimately concludes that we now have a specific "migrant division of labour"; a group 
at the bottom end of London's labour market. This group of labour is increasingly set outside 
political influence and often threatened with possible detention because their stay here is deemed 
semi-legal or illegal. This is paradoxical as many industries are increasingly dependent on migrant 
low-wage so-called "unskilled" labour in e.g. service-industries and manufacturing. And not just, as 
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we traditionally know it, abroad through outsourcing but increasingly at home as well (Wills et.al. 
2009:30ff, 188-190). This implies that a new type of underclass is occurring, constituted by migrant 
workers. 
Who created the migrant division of labour? 
Wills et.al.s argument is that the migrant division of labour was created by the neo-liberal economic 
management starting in UK in the 1980's by Margaret Thatcher. The logic of the neo-liberal 
economic management resulted in the politics of subcontracting. Subcontracting is concretely the 
policy of cutting jobs and instead hire private corporations to fulfil the tasks in e.g. public 
institutions in order to cut costs. Subcontracting is a result of increased privatisation within the state 
and through that employments increasing exposure to market dynamics, consequently pushing 
wages and general conditions of work especially in jobs like cleaning, care and construction, which 
remains among the first jobs to be subcontracted because they are deemed non-essential. The 
politics of subcontracting quickly led to competition between private corporations which mainly 
competed by squeezing wages, staffing and job conditions, while the unions increasingly saw 
themselves without negotiating capabilities for their members while the managers were increasingly 
alienated from the workers, making the ability to wield workers bargaining power nearly impossible  
(Wills et.al.2009: 1-4). The numbers speak their own language in determining the extent of these 
kinds of politics as 93% of British private sector workplaces where outsourcing or subcontracting 
some part of their production in 2004 (Wills et.al. 2009:3-4). Moreover, this number reveals the 
peculiarity of the British case as the developments have not been this extreme in all developed 
countries. 
 
Yet subcontracting has still had massive effects on the socio-economic context of the developed 
economies:  
 
"Indeed, economic growth has occurred alongside a reduction in workers’ share of overall wealth. 
Productivity – and profitability – bargaining are things of the past: quaint relics of the golden age 
of corporatism. In the global North, many of the lowpaid jobs created by subcontracting have been 
devalued to the point that it is hard to find people to fill them; and in the global South, many 
millions earn less than they need to survive." (Wills et.al. 2009:4). 
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The economic model of neo-liberal management and the politics of subcontracting has been 
exported across the world through global supply chains, which imply that companies stretch out 
their production to where the costs are lowest (Bieler 2010 & Wills et.al. 2009:4). Moreover, the 
logic of neo-liberalism is deemed to have spread unevenly across the global economy since the 
1980s (Brenner et. al. 2010). The result is that "(...) the export of this model of economic 
development to the rest of the world has helped to create both the necessity and the desire for 
people to migrate across international borders in search of work." (Wills et.al. 2009:1ff), because 
the spread of this model produces increasing job-competition. In that sense the model produces the 
cheap labour which it needs. 
This analysis corresponds with others which claim that trade unions are increasingly set outside the 
heart of decision-making in the neo-liberal restructuring of the global economy called 
"globalisation" and, ultimately, "globalisation has severely weakened labour" (Bieler et.al. 
2010:247). This can be seen in the general decrease of unionisation of workers and power of unions 
as well as increased demands of flexibilisation of workers, all causing greater job- and income 
insecurity and poorer working conditions in the Eurozone context (Bieler et.al. 2010:247ff, Horn 
2012:577ff & Peterson 2005:508ff). 
 
Even though the precise details of implementation have varied, Wills et.al.'s research showed that 
subcontracting and increased privatisation on a global scale: 
 
"tended to increase unemployment (particularly in the public sector and in those activities exposed 
to international competition) and inequality (as those able to exploit the opportunities associated 
with global subcontracting chains and new sources of investment secured economic advantage). In 
tandem (...) such policies also tended to increase international migration." (Wills et.al. 2009:5). 
 
The conclusion is that migration is a result of economical development, not a result from the lack of 
it, and that the current forms of global political economy including the politics of subcontracting 
have increased global migration (Wills et.al 2009:5-6). However, I would instead argue that 
migration flows are a result of unequal economical development, not just economical development, 
because had all economies developed equally there would be little drive to migrate for work. 
Moreover, even though subcontracting has hurt labour in western context, you might argue that it 
has increased labour participation for people living or born outside the developed nations. This 
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would be the argument if we only count formal labour participation as "real labour" and if we are to 
believe the classical saying that “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to 
the misery of not being exploited at all” (Joan Robinson 1962 as quoted in Economist 2010). 
However, this argument is slanted with the western labour ideal of formalised labour and, more 
fundamentally, a masculinised view upon what constitutes labour and how the only labour valued in 
the economy is the labour which is recognised through wage. However, it is hard to argue against 
that payment through wage gives the individual a freedom which unwaged labour does not. 
Are we creating a new underclass through outsourcing inwards? 
What can we use these insights for? Firstly we can see that there seems to be a trend spreading 
through the developed economies which creates a "migration division of labour" - a class within the 
economy constituted by migrants who are doing the service jobs which no one else wants to do. 
Moreover, we can see that the increasing amount of migrants did not just happen, it was created 
purposely by the politics of subcontracting, pushing wages and labour conditions and ultimately 
creating the reserve army of foreign labour which we see. This movement is clear in domestic work 
where the amount of foreign-born workers versus native-born workers is massive and the workers 
enjoy almost no rights. 
 
The politics of subcontracting is often pictured as resulting in outsourcing through the offshoring of 
production to where the labour is cheapest in order to increase profit and capture rents by cutting 
costs of production through e.g. cheaper wages. This has especially become easier because the costs 
of transportation has decreased, increasing the rent captured by offshoring production and 
ultimately increasing profits (Schwartz 2010:52,223ff). However, what the domestic sector shows is 
that in cases where we cannot offshore our production, we can still outsource it "within" the 
economy to capture rents in a new division of labour where we import the low-wage labour needed 
to sustain those jobs which we are unwilling to perform ourselves.
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ANALYSIS PART 3 
The structural dimensions of the employment of domestic workers 
Moving the analysis to a helicopter-perspective we can see that the domestic sector is underpaid, 
undervalued, deprioritised and highly feminised and dominated by migrants. Whether it is the 
feminised nature of the jobs or the dominance of migrants in the sector which mostly creates its 
undervalued nature is up for debate. We could also, looking through more materialistic glasses, say 
that it is simply the low wage combined with the massive pool of reserve labour willing to take the 
jobs which results in the general undervaluing of the sector; in other words, supply and demand in 
the domestic sector is completely out of line with each other which pushes wage in job competition. 
However, since my theoretical framework is constituted of economical feminism, I would like to 
use this framework and dwell on the feminism point of view in the context of the developed 
countries. 
Women's triple work-shift 
Women's increasing participation in the labour market, where the trend in the developed economies 
is that women's participation is slowly, but steady, increasing (ILO 2010b:11, 89), has increased 
work pressure on the individual women. It is expected that women are to work so-called triple 
shifts, both working in familial activities as taking care of both younger and elders in the family, 
informal activities such as domestic work and formal activities which is the job that is waged and 
constitutes the so-called "participation in the labour market" (Peterson 2005:502ff). This obviously 
leaves to question how we count participation in the labour market, since the work of familial and 
informal character contributes to our economy even though it is not waged nor acknowledged as 
"real work". 
However, what really becomes interesting is that with women's increasing participation in the 
formal labour market, the increase in male participation in familial and informal activities is yet to 
come. What we see is that more women than men are doing part-time work, where a significantly 
part of women are doing part-time work due to personal and familial responsibilities, while the 
amount of men doing the same is almost non-existing (EU 2012:8-9). Generally, women are doing 
more unpaid familial and domestic work and women on average in the OECD countries spend 40 
minutes a day on "care for household members" versus men's 16 minutes, and 168 minutes on 
"routine housework" versus men's 74 minutes (OECD 2014). 
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What is the result of this? Women are expected to do more work which I will argue produces a need 
for help in the familial and informal work that obviously creates a pull-effect for domestic workers. 
Moreover, what we have seen with the neo-liberal politics of subcontracting is that wages have 
decreased and have in many cases caused general cuts in public spending, further pressuring the 
private homes to be able to provide for their own welfare (Peterson 2005:509-510). This results in 
an increasing pressure on the female labour force: 
 
"When public provision declines, women are culturally expected to fill the gap, in spite of fewer 
available resources, more demands on their time and minimal increases in men's caring labour." 
(Peterson 2005:510). 
 
This puts extra pressure on the hiring of domestic workers to help. On a global scale one in 13 of 
female wage-earners are domestic workers according to ILO's study (ILO 2013:19). In reality the 
propositions are probably even higher due to the conservative estimates that ILO applied. 
Moreover, as we know that women are traditionally expected to do domestic work without wage, 
we can only guess at how high the actual proportions are globally. This makes domestic work not 
just a sector of work, but a structural condition for the female workforce. This also creates an active 
pull-factor for female workers in the domestic sector because we culturally expect females to fulfil 
the jobs of caring, cooking and cleaning, and thus it would seem likely that we when hiring 
outsiders to perform household chores, are more willing to let women do the job rather than men. 
 
Looking at a qualitative study of full-time working mothers in London and Madrid, it seems that the 
individual mother's need to combine work and care function as a pull mechanism. The model of 
having a home-based substitute mother doing caring and domestic work during working hours was 
by the mothers themselves considered the best way to combine work and care for very young 
children (Williams & Gavanas 2008:20). In other words the pull factor is not just constituted by 
women's participation in the labour market and resulting absence at home, but also by norms of 
"best practice" - i.e. that the care part of domestic work is better fulfilled at home than in another 
household. 
From "male breadwinner" to "adult worker" 
The development of increased female participation in the formal labour market in the developed 
economies is also seen as a socio-economic shift from a "male breadwinner" to an "adult worker" 
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model of familial standard. In the male breadwinner-model it was expected that the male was the 
only participator of the labour market. On the other hand in the adult worker-model "(...) it is 
expected that both women and men will be earning in the labour market" (Williams & Gavanas 
2008:13). In that sense the informal and familial work was not unrecognised - instead it was seen as 
a full-time job for the housewife, where the husband worked to earn the wage to finance the 
household which the housewife was keeping. Migrant women was in this context not excluded, 
instead, using UK as an example, migrant women where actually in the 50s and 60s taken in to 
sustain the male breadwinner-model. They where used to meet the demands on the market for low-
wage labour while making it possible for the native-born women to stay at home. In the "adult 
worker"-model there is still a pull for low-wage migrant women, but instead of them working in the 
formal labour market to give the local women the option of staying at home, they are working as 
domestic workers in the private families to give local women the option of working in the more 
prestigious formal workplaces (Williams & Gavanas 2008:14ff).  
 
In this way, female migrants illustrate some of the socio-economic changes in society and in the 
nature of work; the changes in family-structure with an increasing number of female-breadwinners 
and increasing use of "outsiders" in domestic work and care-work; the changes in work with 
increasing female participation in formal work and an increasing rise in the amount of service-jobs. 
Moreover, female migrants also illustrate some of the changes occurring within the nation-state 
with increased globalization and increased transfer of workers across nations (Williams & Gavanas 
2008:15). 
Public provisions & the state's role in contributing to the use of domestic workers 
Another development which is highly differentiated across developed economies and which can 
constitute a pull-factor is how many public provisions the individual state is supplying its citizens. 
As formerly stated, whenever public provisions decrease women are culturally expected to fill the 
gap. Thus the level of public provision such as child-care and elder-care matters. Moreover, it 
matters how public provisions are given. 
 
In some countries, particularly the welfare states, domestic work and care-work has been converted 
into skilled jobs through the establishment of educations for same work. I will argue that converting 
domestic work from unskilled to skilled labour creates less job-competition and a higher valuation 
of the work. The level of public provisions provided for the family is differing across developed 
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economies. The Nordic welfare-states are ranking highest on the level of public provision as 
services which correlates with them ranking rather low on the use of domestic workers. My 
argument will be that substantially high levels of public contribution to families render domestic 
workers less needed. However, France, which employ a rather high level of domestic workers, also 
have high public provisions both as cash and services (EU 2012:3 & OECD 2013), and in that way 
my argument is not universal but particular to the Nordic context and probably constitutes one of 
many factors determining the usage of domestic workers. Instead we could look at more historical 
or cultural factors in determining why e.g. France despite having high level of public provisions 
also have high employment of domestic workers - however I see this as going beyond the scope of 
this project. 
  
Another contributing factor is not just the level of public provisions aimed at the family, but the 
very nature of state support which shapes the need for domestic help (Williams & Gavanas 
2008:14). Europe has seen a shift from providing care services to giving cash payments instead to 
provide the individual family with childcare or eldercare. The money is then often used on the 
private market to provide for care-help at the home. This policy shapes the demand for low-wage 
domestic workers because when people are given the money to provide for the domestic help they 
need they tend to go for the cheapest price, whereas if the state provides help with domestic work 
through jobs they more often have regulations of labour of which they have to live up to, shaping 
the demand of the labour market (Williams & Gavanas 2008). In other words if the state either 
offers no social and care services or offers them as cash payments it will reflect on the employment 
of domestic workers. 
Income inequality as driver of migrant domestic workers in western context 
I will now turn my look towards the global dynamics of domestic workers. Even though my project 
concerns domestic workers in developed economies, I do believe that looking at international data 
on the use of domestic workers will reveal some of the economical drivers behind the employment 
of domestic workers. Primarily how income inequality functions as a push and pull-factor in the 
amount of domestic worker employment. 
 
Contradicting general assumptions Europe and Northern America which are the economically most 
prosperous part of the world does not constitute the region with the highest level of domestic 
workers. On the contrary, even though domestic workers often search for work across borders the 
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regional patterns of domestic workers emphasises other regions than the advanced economies. In 
general domestic work accounts for estimated 0.9 % of female wage-employment in the developed 
countries and as low as between 0,1-0,3 in Nordic Countries (ILO 2013:35,37,117-119). However, 
it should be recalled that these numbers are conservative estimates and thus constitutes the 
minimum amount. What is common for the Nordic countries is that the state supplies public 
provision for e.g. childcare and elder-care, rendering employment of domestic workers on a grand 
scale unnecessary (Isaksen 2010:10). However, other countries in Europe are widespread users of 
migrant domestic workers, especially Spain, France and Italy rank high, having respectively 8,4%, 
4,1% and 4,0 % of total female employment in the countries, while Cyprus (9,7%), Greece (4,8%), 
and Portugal (8,4%) are also worth mentioning (ILO 2013:35-36,117-119). These countries also 
have a far majority of foreign-born domestic workers where Spain and France mostly employ 
women from their former colonies who speak the native language (ILO 2013:35-37). This points to 
a more cultural feature of migrant domestic work; that the colonial bond between former colonies 
and their former colonial rulers matters. In northern America the stats are even lower than what is 
generally assumed, with 0,9 % of the total female wage-employment being domestic workers in 
both the US and Canada (ILO 2013:29, 117-119). This is particularly interesting because US is 
highlighted in literature as an example of employment of domestic workers (see e.g. Ehrenreich & 
Hochschild 2003) even though they in statistical terms are not very common users of same. 
In eastern Europe and the CIS1 countries the levels of domestic workers are similarly low, mostly 
below 1% of female wage-employment with very few exceptions. However, the area is a high 
exporter of domestic workers to western Europe (ILO 2013:38,119-121). This is particularly 
interesting because the eastern European countries and the CIS-countries are relatively poorer than 
the western European countries. 
 
Why am I highlighting all of these numbers? Because they all point to the fact that domestic work is 
a minor sector in the developed countries, and that it is not pure economy that drives migrant 
domestic workers. Instead I will now try to turn my view outwards to other regions to see where 
domestic work is most widespread and why. 
                                               
1 Commonwealth of Independent States which are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
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Income inequality as driver in global context 
In pure numbers Asia and the Pacific are the countries with the highest number of domestic workers 
- both male and female. However, looking at the percentage of female domestic workers of the total 
female wage-employment it is the Middle East with 31,8 % and Latin America and Caribbean with 
26,6 % which ranks highest. What is really interesting is that Latin America and Caribbean is the 
only region which have seen a significant (above 0,3 percentage points) increase between 1995 and 
2010 (ILO 2013:20). 
In the Latin America and Caribbean-case it seems that what is really driving the demand for migrant 
domestic workers is not prosperity per se but relative prosperity - the region's high levels of income 
inequality seems to pull more migrant domestic workers both within and across borders. Moreover, 
the countries have seen an increase in women entering the labour market, further increasing the 
demand for domestic workers to help carry the women's triple workload (ILO 2013:24-28). 
In the Middle Eastern Case, which constitutes the region with the highest level of domestic workers 
both male and female, there seems to be different drivers. Firstly, the levels are rather high because 
the amount of women doing formal work is fairly low, distorting the general picture. However, the 
reasons for this regions high levels also seems to be more cultural since it is considered a sign of 
wealth to have domestic workers and is in several Middle Eastern-countries expected (ILO 
2013:31-33). 
Asia and the Pacific is a different story, though there have the de facto highest levels of domestic 
workers the percentage of female domestic workers constitute 7,8 % of paid employment. The area 
is a high exporter of domestic workers both intra-regional as well as to other regions. Moreover, the 
numbers of domestic workers are rather uncertain and due to the largeness of the area and the 
number of people this creates a large uncertainty on the actual number. India and China, for 
instance, have unofficial estimates of the number of domestic workers ranging from 2.5 million to 
100 million. Lastly, in this region it seems to be that the income inequality also drives much of the 
migration in domestic work which routes from relatively poor countries such as Sri Lanka, 
Myanmar, Indonesia and Philippines to relatively wealthier Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, 
while many also find their way to the Middle East (ILO 2013:28-31). 
Africa, at last, has different drivers. Female domestic workers constitute 13,6 % of female wage-
employment, yet data was only available in some of the countries with the highest levels of 
employment, making it rather uncertain. Many former colonies in Africa have tradition for 
  33 
employing domestic workers widely established in the colonial periods. Moreover, as with the other 
regions income inequality seems to be another strong driver (ILO 2013:33-35). 
 
Generally, it seems that the developing world rather than the developed world is more keen to hire 
domestic workers, breaking with the general assumption that it is total prosperousness which pulls 
high levels of domestic workers. Moreover, income inequality seems to be a driver for migrant 
domestic workers and the level of hiring domestic workers - there simply needs to be a group either 
within or near of relatively lower income to supply domestic workers in order to even create a 
demand for domestic workers. Also within the European context there seems to be a migrant flow 
of domestic workers from the less wealthy eastern European countries and CIS-countries to the 
wealthier western Europe, corresponding with this conclusion. 
What the flows of domestic workers in the developing countries reveal about 
domestic workers in developed countries 
My initial analysis showed that the increasing female participation in the formal labour market as 
well as the politics of subcontracting creates pull effects for domestic workers. However, looking at 
the global context of domestic workers this could be questioned. The developing countries are to a 
far greater extent employing domestic workers even though the female participation in the labour 
market is, at least in Middle East, North Africa, Caribbean and Latin America and South Asia, 
relatively lower; Especially considering that Middle East and Caribbean and Latin America ranges 
highest on the employment of domestic workers but low on female participation in the labour 
market (21,6% & 46,5% of all working-age females employed as compared to 48,3% in the 
developed countries) (ILO 2010b:12). Even though the increased participation of women in the 
labour market might explain why the demand for domestic workers has risen over the past years in 
the context of the individual countries, it cannot explain why the demand for domestic workers is 
stronger in countries with less working women. 
 
Moreover, the politics of neo-liberal subcontracting has been used as explanatory in the western 
context. However, the wave of neo-liberalism struck the developing countries much later than the 
developed countries, and if this was the primarily driver we would expect the employment of 
domestic workers to be much higher in countries highly affected by these policies such as UK and 
US than in the rest of the world. However, it is still possibly one of several pull-factors within the 
  34 
European context, yet it also becomes evident that reasons for the level of employment of domestic 
workers is much more complex than can be isolated in just one or two pull factors. 
 
If we can say that the increasing female participation in the labour market and the politics of 
subcontracting of the 1980s are not completely determining factors in explaining the flows of 
migrant domestic workers on a global scale, then what is? I see that the dynamics of two factors can 
widely explain the employment of domestic workers: The combination of income inequality and the 
state's supply of public provisions targeting the families. We have seen that income inequality is 
determining on a broader scale. That if a country is in a context of strong income inequality either 
nationally or regionally they will be more keen on hiring domestic workers. Moreover we have seen 
that with some exceptions the amount of public provisions given as services to the family through 
e.g. care-work can be hindering to widespread employment of domestic workers. This would 
explain the widespread employment of domestic workers in the developing states which have weak 
states and suffers from general lack of welfare provisions. However, as France and the US 
exemplifies these are not ultimate determinants. The argument could be that the subcontracting 
policies of neo-liberalism pulls e.g. UK further towards a situation similar to those countries which 
have never had an active state with the capabilities of supplying welfare provisions; That 
subcontracting makes a developed economy more similar to the developing economy.
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Conclusion 
In this project I have tried to answer the question which economical pull-factors can explain the 
widespread demand for unregulated female migrants in domestic work in developed countries? 
The answer is not as straightforward as the question may sound and my conclusion is that there are 
a complex multitude of economical pull-factors which explain the demand for female migrants in 
domestic work. However, what has become evidently clear is that we, in fact, know very little of 
how deep domestic workers are penetration our economies and in what numbers, even though the 
domestic work that we have registered constitutes one of the biggest employments worldwide, 
domestic work still contains a massive informal sector. 
 
Domestic work has traditionally been considered women's work and continue to be so. There are 
around 17% men in the domestic sector globally but they perform types of domestic work more 
traditionally masculine such as security guards and gardeners, not cooking, cleaning and care-work, 
which is still reserved women. This means that even today in the developed economies of e.g. 
Europe it is expected that the woman of the household performs the majority of household chores. 
However, with women's increasing participation in the formal labour market as wage-earners the 
time to do domestic work withers and a need for domestic workers emerges. This marks a new type 
of family structure, from the "male breadwinner"-model where it was expected that the man of the 
household was working full-time and the woman was a full-time housewife to the "adult worker"-
model where both adults are working full-time on the formal labour market, leaving less time for 
domestic work but without the workload disappearing. Thus women's participation in the formal 
labour market becomes a pull-factor for female migrant domestic workers - at least in the short term 
and in European context. Some women have describe it as a type of "best of evils" to have domestic 
workers taking care of their children at their home rather than somewhere else. It is moreover 
almost exclusively women who are employed to do these types of domestic work, creating a pull for 
females specifically. Essentially the pull of migrant women in developed countries is related to 
what is considered prestigious work by native-born women. Previously developed economies 
imported migrant women to work in the formal labour market to give native-born women the 
possibility to stay at home, now it is the reverse, importing migrant women to do domestic work to 
make the native-born women able to work in the formal labour market. 
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Domestic work for a large part constitutes a "hidden" workload which is rarely recognised as "real 
work" and traditionally rarely waged. Today when domestic workers are hired they are rarely 
recognised with minimum wage or formal working conditions while their labour power and 
unionisation have historically been poor. Moreover, up to 50% of domestic workers in developed 
countries are not covered by labour legislation, with the numbers being even lower in the 
developing world. What does this mean? It means that the job is considered low-skilled, is 
undervalued and ultimately low-waged. Since the population in developed countries will not take 
jobs that are both undervalued and low-waged the industry hires migrant workers who are much 
less picky. This is a trend very evident in London where most of the low-skilled service jobs are 
done by migrant workers. 
This group of migrant workers are now seen to constitute a new socio-economic layer where they 
are the lowest "class" in the economy, doing the jobs that the native-born population will not. 
Ultimately, many industries have become highly dependent on an army of migrant labour, including 
the domestic work-sector. Thus the need for low-wage labour in sectors where the population are 
not willing to take the jobs constitutes a pull-factor. Another perspective on this is seeing the need 
to outsource as a pull-factor. It is quite common in manufacturing industries to move the production 
to where the labour is cheapest. However, domestic work is place-bound and cannot be offshored. 
Instead the industries are employing migrants as a distinct group of labour, outsourcing within the 
country instead of outsourcing through offshoring. These practices are related to the neo-liberal 
policy of subcontracting where jobs deemed non-essential are moved outside the state or the 
company itself to push costs and ultimately wages. However, even though these jobs are deemed 
"non-essential" they are still needed, and this need for low-wage labour in the service industry is a 
strong pull-factor for migrant domestic workers. 
 
However, the pull-factor which ultimately matters the most in explaining the employment of 
domestic workers in the developed countries are the dynamics of unequal economical development, 
income inequality, and the states' supply of public provisions.  
Unequal economical development matters because it essentially is the unequal development of 
different economies which creates migration, not the lack of development. Income inequality is one 
of the main pull-factors of migrant domestic workers. In Europe it is seen that eastern Europeans 
migrate to relatively wealthier western Europe to work as domestic workers. However, the 
developing world is using domestic workers on far bigger scale than the developed, which has to do 
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with their greater income inequality. On a global scale there is no visible connection between the 
level of women on the formal labour market and increased employment of domestic workers - 
which is why I have deemed women's participation on the labour market a short-term pull-factor in 
the context of Europe. On the other hand there is great connection between income inequality and 
the employment of domestic women. One example is that we see women from Sri Lanka, 
Myanmar, Indonesia and Philippines migrate to relatively wealthier Malaysia, Singapore and Hong 
Kong, as well as most of Middle East, to find work at the relatively more prosperous part of 
population. It seems that having countries or areas which are relatively, but notably, richer, is 
pulling labour migrants to cross borders and apply for domestic work in order to get their share. 
 
Lastly, the level of public provision matters. Generally, with France as exception, countries with 
high levels of public provision in services targeting the individual household employ lower levels of 
domestic workers. It also matters whether public provision is given in services or cash, as cash 
payments tend to increase the level of low-wage migrant domestic workers who are then competing 
on the market, rather than as services provided by the state and thus covered by state regulation. 
Therefore low levels of public provision as well as public provisions given as cash payments are 
some of the more powerful pull-factors in the employment of migrant domestic workers. 
Further Perspectives 
Some relevant aspects have not been touched upon in this project. Firstly, I have analysed socio-
economical dynamics on a broad scale and it would do well to be complemented with case-studies, 
particularly the case of France would be of interest because it essentially differs from my 
conclusions. Furthermore, the importance of culture as a pull-factor for migrants through e.g. 
diaspora-networks or colonial bonds would be of interest and have impact on the light in which we 
see domestic workers. 
I have looked at the pull-factors for female migrant domestic workers, however the push-factors are 
just as interesting, and looking only at the pull-factors results in a tendency to see only one part of 
the story. 
Lastly, many political initiatives are currently trying to improve the working conditions of domestic 
workers and unionise them. ILO's convention on domestic workers has been ratified by a handful of 
countries (ILO 2013:1) and the newly formed The International Domestic Workers' Federation 
would be interesting to follow to see whether they will provide domestic workers with the 
regulation that the sector needs. 
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